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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Utah Supreme Court
Case No. 20020307-SA

PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,

Court of Appeals
Case No. 20000071-CA

vs.
SEAN THOMPSON,
Defendant-Respondent.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over both subject matter and procedural issues that are
relevant to this case. Pursuant to Rule 46 (a)(4) of the Utah R. App. P., jurisdiction of this Court
is properly invoked because of the following considerations:
A. The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter wasfiledon March 7,
2002. That opinion decided important questions of Utah state law, namely the scope and
constitutionality of portions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-20 l-(l)(b).
B. While it affirmed the validity and constitutionality of part of § 76-9-201 (l)(b),
the Court of Appeals also held that other parts of the statute were facially overbroad and,
therefore unconstitutional. As provided in Rule 46(a)(4) of the Utah R. App.P., the final
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (l)(b) has not yet been, but should be, settled by this
Court.
C. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(g) confers appellate jurisdiction upon this court to
determine and/or review questions of whether a statute of this state complies with requirements
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of the United States and Utah constitutions.
D. On April 8, 2002, Plaintiff-Petitioner ("Provo") filed with this Court a petition
for a writ of certiorari. On August 29, 2002, this Court granted that petition so|that it could
determine whether all or part of § 76-9-201 (l)(b) is constitutional.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201
(1)

A person is guilty of telephone harassment and subject to prosebution in the

jurisdiction where the telephone call originated or was received if with intent to annoy,
alarm another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten harass, or creating a risk thereof, the
person:
(a)

makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues;

(b)

makes repeated telephone calls, whether or not conversation
ensues, or after having been told not to call back, causes the
telephone of another to ring repeatedly or contiguously
sly;
makes a telephone call and insults, taunts or ch^llen:ges the
recipient of the telephone call or any person at the called number in
a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response,

(d)

makes a telephone call and uses any lewd or prdf<ane language or
suggests any lewd or lascivious act; or

(e)

makes a telephone call and threatens to inflict injury, physical
harm, or damage to any person or the property 4f any person.

(2)

Telephone harassment is a class B misdemeanor.
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United States Constitution, Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of
grievances.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV
... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person, of life
liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 15
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the
press...

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about May 1, 1999, Thompson was charged by Information with Telephone
Harassment, a class B misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201, in Fourth District Court,
Provo Department. On October 29, 1999, a bench trial was held before the Honorable Anthony
W. Schofiled. After testimony from the alleged victim, the responding officer, and Thompson,
the Court ruled in favor of the City of Provo and convicted Thompson of telephone harassment.

On December 20, 1999, Thompson was sentenced to 15 hours of community service and a $250
fine. Thompson filed a timely appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. That court affirmed the
conviction of Thompson, relying in part on language in the second part of subsection (l)(b) of
the 1999 telephone harassment statute. Provo City v. Thompson, 2002 UT Apt 63,1J26, 44 P.3d
828, 834. The Court of Appeals also held that the first part of subsection (l)(b) was facially
overbroad and unconstitutional. Thompson, 2002 UT App 63,ffi[21,27, 4 4 p-fd

a t 833

> 834-35.

Subsequently on November 21, 2002, Provo City filed an appeal with the Utalf Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
In the bench trial the alleged victim, Ms. Thayer, testified that Thompslon called
numerous times within the hour. (Tr. at 7). Thayer testified that she asked Thompson to cease
his phone calls. (Tr. at 8). The responding police officer, Bastian, testified that while he was at
the home of Thayer investigating the telephone calls, Thompson again called, Iwherein Bastian
picked up the receiver and spoke with Thompson. (Tr. at 13). Bastian re quested to meet with
Thompson at Thompson's home. (Tr. at 14). Upon arriving at Thompson's qome Bastian
indicated that he smelled alcohol and Thompson admitted to drinking beer. ( r. at 14).
Thompson took the stand and testified that he received a telephone call from Thayer and
she told Thompson that she was going to harm herself (suicide) and possibly 1harm Thompson's
daughter. (Tr. at 17 & 20). At the time Thayer lived alone with the couples young daughter. (R.
45-5). Thompson testified that he called Thayer numerous times because he Reared Thayer was a
danger to herself and to Thompson's daughter. (Tr. at 21). Thompson repeatedly called Thayer
because he had been taught in school to keep calling to assist a person threatening suicide. (Tr.
at 20).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has declared in two separate cases that Utah Code Ann. § 769-201 (1999) is unconstitutionally overbroad. (See Provo City v. Thompson, 442 Utah Adv. Rep.
24, 2002 UT App 63, 44 P.3d 828, and Provo City v. Whatcott, 2000 UT App 86, 1 P.3d 1113,
(Ut. App. 2000)). Respondent argues that these decisions should be affirmed. The telephone
harassment statute in this case has a real and substantial deterrent effect on protected speech and
a court's narrowing construction of the statute is not possible. Because the statute is overbroad
and unconstitutional it must be stricken down because it violates the guarantees of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution as well as Article I, §§ 7 and 15 of the
Utah Constitution. Based on these considerations the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in
this case should be affirmed and Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (1999) should be struck down on
the basis that it is unconstitutionally overbroad.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT
UTAH CODE ANN. 76-9-201 IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD
BECAUSE IT AIMS AT REGULATING CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
SPEECH.
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that parts of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201
(1999) were unconstitutionally overbroad on its face..
Faced with overbreadth and vagueness attacks on a statute or ordinance, our first task is
to determine whether the enactment makes unlawful a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail
and we should then examine the facial vagueness challenge. If it does, it may be held
facially invalid even if it also has legitimate application.
Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted).
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In fact the Court of Appeals had already heard and decided in Provo City v. Whatcott,
2000 UT App 86, 1 P.3d 1113 (Ut. App. 2000) that subsection (a) of Utah Code Ann. 76-9-201
was unconstitutionally overbroad.
"An enactment which is unconstitutionally overbroad 'is one which does not aim
specifically at evils within the knowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within
its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of
speech or the press.'" Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97, 60 S.Ct. 736, 741-42 (1940)) (additional citation
omitted).
The Court of Appeals said of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201; "presumably, the Legislature
intended to prohibit threatening and menacing calls, and calls that would provoke a breach of the
peace. This is certainly within the Legislature's power, and does not offend tne First
Amendment... But section 76-9-201 sweeps even more broadly. Under subsection (a), the statute
prohibits any 'telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues,' where the caller has
'recklessly creatfed] a risk' of'annoy[ing], alarm[ing]..., intimidatfing], offend[ing], abus[ing],
threaten[ing], harassing], or frighten[ing]' the recipient." Provo City v. Thompson, 2002 UT
App 63 at H17.
The Court gave several reasons why the statute would "prohibit a potentially huge
universe of otherwise legitimate telephone calls." Provo City v. Whatcott, 200 UT App. 86 at
1fl[10-l 1. These examples included, "(1) unwanted telephone solicitations made to a private
home during the dinner hour; (2) calls from a mother to 'a young adult who has recently moved
out of the family home,' which the mother makes in order 'to make sure he i(s alright,' and which

she continues to make despite 'his exasperation (frequently and vocally expressed)'; (3) calls
from 'a consumer... [to] the seller or producer of a product to express dissatisfaction of product
performance;' (4) calls from 'a businessman... [to] another to protest failure to perform a
contractual obligation;' and (5) calls from 'a constituent... [to] his legislator to protest the
legislator's stand on an issue.'" Id. at 1fl[12, 14 (quoting State v. Dronso, 279 N.W.2d 710, 714
(Wis.Ct.App. 1979)). The Court then went on to explain why all of these calls would be
prohibited under Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201; "... because of the callers' conscious disregard of
the substantial likelihood that the call would annoy [the recipient and thus] bring the call within
the statute's ambit." Id. at ^[12. 'These few examples show that the overbreadth of subsection
(a) is [both] real and substantial." Id. at 1J14.
A statute that legitimately punishes some speech but which might be construed to inhibit
a substantial amount of protected speech may be unconstitutionally overbroad. New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768-69, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3360-61, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). Although the
statute as applied to the particular defendant raising the challenge may comport with
constitutional limitations on a state's power to prohibit expressive activity, the danger that broad
readings could result in unconstitutional applications may be enough to render the entire statute
infirm. This sort of challenge, which implicates hypothetical applications of a statute to the
speech of third persons not before the court, constitutes an exception to traditional rules of
standing, New YorkState Club Ass 'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11,108 S.Ct. 2225, 2233,
101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988), but this exception is justified by the recognition that the interests the first
amendment is designed to protect "may be inhibited almost as easily by the potential or
threatened use of power as by the actual exercise of that power." Id. (citing Thornhill v. Alabama,
1

310 U.S. 88, 97-98, 60 S.Ct. 736, 741-42, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940)); see also Feriber, 458 U.S. at
768, 102 S.Ct. at 3360-61 (describing deterrent effect on protected speech of overly broad
statutes); Village ofSchaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.p. 620, 634, 100
S.Ct. 826, 834-35, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980).
"[Overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as welll, judged in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 41J U.S. 601, 615, 93
S.Ct. 2908, 2917-18, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). The defendant must demonstrate "a realistic danger
that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of
parties not before the [c]ourt" before a statute will be struck down as facially overbroad. City
Council ofLos Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801, 104 S.Q. 2118, 2126-27, 80
L.Ed.2d 772 (1984).
"Facial challenges to overly broad statutes are allowed not primarily for the benefit of the
litigant, but for the benefit of society-to prevent the statute from chilling the First Amendment
rights of other parties not before the court." Secretary of State of Maryland v.Joseph H. Munson
Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984). For this reason, any sense of
injustice created by the windfall to a guilty defendant is vastly outweighed by the benefit to
society in protecting the right to free expression. Id.
SUBSECTION (b) OF UTAH CODE ANN. 76-9-201 WAS ALSO

CORRECTLY FOUND TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD.
For the same reasons discussed above the Court of Appeals also held that subsection (b)
of Utah Code Ann. 76-9-201 was unconstitutionally overbroad. Subsection ib) contains two
parts. Thefirstpart prohibits the "making of repeated telephone calls, whether or not a
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conversation ensues," if the caller acts with the requisite intent, i.e., "with intent to annoy, alarm
another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, or frighten any person at the called number or
recklessly creates a risk thereof." Utah Code Ann. 76-9-201 (l)(b) (1999). The second prohibits
the "causing of the telephone of another to ring repeatedly or continuously" if the caller "has
been told not to call back," and if the caller acts with the requisite intent. Id.
Subsection (a) prohibits "a single telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues," if
made with the requisite intent. Utah Code Ann. 76-9-201 (l)(a) (1999). The first part of
subsection (b) criminalizes "repeated telephone calls, whether or not a conversation ensues," if
made with the requisite intent. Utah Code Ann. 76-9-201 (l)(b) (1999). Prohibiting repeated
calls rather than only single calls does little to narrow the field of otherwise legitimate
communications that subsection (a) unconstitutionally "sweeps within its ambit." Huber, 786
P.2datl375.
Once again the Court of Appeals cited several examples of how this could be
unconstitutional by prohibiting protected speech. "The telephone solicitor who attempts to call
again 'at a more convenient time'; the overly anxious mother who calls her grown son repeatedly
despite his expressed exasperation; the consumer who calls customer service the first, second,
third, and fourth times her computer crashes; the businessman who leaves a voice mail message
for his counterpart at another company regarding an unperformed contractual term, then calls
again later to speak in person, and then calls a third time - or twenty times- to "keep the pressure
on"; and the concerned citizen who calls on different occasions to chastize his legislator for her
stance on varied issues might all be subject to prosecution under the first part of subsection (b),
as well as under subsection (a). Provo City v. Thompson, AA P.3d 828, 833 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002).
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Again, it is the caller's "conscious disregard of the substantial likelihood that the repeated calls
would annoy the recipient that brings the call within the statute's ambit." Whhtcott, 2000 UT
App. 86, 1 P.3d 1113. The Court went on to hold that "because both the first pnd repeat calls in
the above scenarios are legitimate, we hold that the first part of subsection (b)| is... overbroad and
unconstitutional." Provo City v. Thompson, 44 P.3d 828, 833 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002)
The Court then looked at the second part of subsection (b). This part m subsection (b)
prohibits "causing the telephone of another to ring repeatedly or continuously when one has
"been told not to call back," and when one acts with the requisite intent. Utah Code Ann. 76-9
201(l)(b) (1999). In order to conclude that a statute is unconstitutionally oveproad "where
conduct and not merely speech is involved... the overbreadth of a statute musf not only be real,
but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). [The court
distinguished between the first part of subsection (b) and the second part andl held that "unlike
subsection (a) and the first part of subsection (b), any possible overbreadth q the second part of
subsection (b) is not substantial. Provo City v. Thompson, 44 P.3d 828, 834 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002).
"The distinguishing factor of the second part of subsection (b) is that to be pitosecuted under it,
on must have been told not to call back and yet, with the requisite intent, nevertheless then
'causes the telephone of another to ring repeatedly or continuously." Id. "The right of free
speech is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so
there must be opportunity to win their attention." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87, 69 S.Ct.
448, 454, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949). (emphasis added). Clearly, there is no right to audibly invade
another's home or place of business by telephone ring in an attempt to comrrjiandeer her listening
10

ear when she has affirmatively expressed a desire to be left alone. Cf Id. at 87-88, 69 S.Ct. at
454.

OVERBREADTH CHALLENGE TO UTAH CODE ANN. 76-9-201 IS VALID.
The Supreme Court has stated that when a statute or ordinance aims at penalizing an
unprotected class of speech, it "must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish
only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression." Gooding
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1106. See also Logan City v. Ruber, 786 P.2d at
1375 (Utah App. 1990). The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech do not allow the
government to punish words outside of "narrowly limited classes of speech." Ruber, 786 P.2d at
1374. An overbroad enactment is one "'which does not aim specifically at evils within the
allowable area of state control, but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit other activities that
in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or the press.'" Ruber, 786
P.2d at 1375 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97, 60 S.Ct. 736, 741-42, 84 L.Ed.
1093(1940)).
The merit of a First Amendment overbreadth challenge is determined by analyzing two
factors: (1) Whether the statute's "'deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both real and
substantial;' and (2) Whether the statute is 'readily subject to a narrowing construction by the
state courts.'" State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837, 841 (Utah 1978) (quoting Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 2276, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975)). If the statute's
deterrent effect on protected expression is both real and substantial and the statute is not readily
subject to a narrowing construction by state courts then it is unconstitutionally overbroad.
Petitioner states that the Appellate Court incorrectly applied the "overbreadth" doctrine to
11

this case and then cites examples where the Utah Supreme Court has defined this doctrine. "A
statute will not be held overbroad unless it makes unlawful a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah App.
1997). Petitioner argues that Utah Code Ann. 76-9-201 is only directed against offensive
conduct and not any legitimate communications of ideas (emphasis added). Petitioner then
makes the argument that this takes the speech out of the protective realm of constitutionally
protected speech under the 1st Amendment. However, Petitioner ignores the fact that the Court
of Appeals expressly found that Utah Code Ann. 76-9-201 specifically made illegal legitimate
forms of communication which are protected by the Constitution. Under the Act a telemarketer
could be prosecuted because he was calling knowing that it was likely that the call would harass.
As Respondent has already argued, Utah's telephone harassment statute has a real and
substantial deterrent effect on protected speech. For example, the statute precludes one from
making a telephone call with intent to "alarm" another. The deterrent effect of this language on
constitutionally protected speech has no limits. This overbroad choice of words conceivably
makes it criminal in Utah to call one's neighbor and warn him that his house is on fire, or to call
a friend and forecast an approaching storm. See Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80, 83 (Col. 1975).
The statute also precludes one from making a telephone call with intent to "annoy"
another. There are many instances where one may call another with the intention of causing
slight annoyance for perfectly legitimate constitutionally protected purposes.] Conceivably, this
statute could make criminal a single telephone call made by the following :individuals: a
consumer who wishes to express dissatisfaction over the performance of a pfoduce or service; a
businessman disturbed with another's failure to perform a contractual obligation; an irate citizen
12

who wishes to complain to a public official; an individual bickering over family matters; or a
creditor seeking to collect payment of a past due bill. See People v. Klick, 362 N.E.2d 329, 33132(111.1977).
The term "harass" as used in the statute is merely a persistent annoyance and should be
considered on the same guidelines as "annoy." Conceivably, this statute could make criminal
repeated telephone calls made by the following individuals: a consumer who wishes to express
dissatisfaction over the performance of a produce or service that continues to fails after being
repaired. Indeed the "lemon laws" to handle such situations expect the dissatisfaction of a
consumer who expresses dissatisfaction on more than one occasion.; a businessman disturbed
with another's failure to perform a contractual obligation after being told once of the
dissatisfaction but because of no change in behavior must call back and "harass"; or even a
person/therapist/police officer attempting to stop a suicide and calling back to ensure the person
does not harm herself.
The First Amendment is made of "sterner stuff." Bolles, P.2d at 83. The people of Utah
must not live in continual fear that something they say over the telephone with intent to "annoy",
"harass", "offend", or "alarm" the listener will invoke the statute. Free speech may best fulfill its
high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with present conditions
or even stirs people to anger. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52, 85 S.Ct. 453, 462-63, 13
L.Ed.2d 471 (1965).
Unquestionably, the State of Utah has a legitimate and substantial interest in protecting its
residents from fear and abuse at the hands of persons who employ the telephone to torment
others. United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3rd Cir. 1978); Klick, 362 N.E.2d at 331.
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The State also has a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of its residents^ homes from the
intrusion of unwanted and perverse phone calls. City of Everett v. Moore, 683 P.2d 617, 619
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984). However, the means chosen by the legislature to address these interests
sweep too broadly. Clearly, the legislature failed in its duty to employ the least drastic means
available to achieve these purposes. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5
L.Ed.2d231 (1960).
Utah's telephone harassment statute is not limited to intrusions into thi home.
Furthermore, it is not limited to communications which abuse the listener "in an essentially
intolerable manner" as required by the Constitution when the government seeks to "shut off
discourse solely to protect others from hearing it." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21, 91
S.Ct. 1780, 1786, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971). Plainly, the statute lacks the "precision of regulation"
required by a statute "so closely touching our most precious freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 340, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). Thus, the deterrent jffect of the statrite
on legitimate speech is both real and substantial.
NARROWING JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION GOES AG^NST
LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
Utah Code Annotated 76-9-201 is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the
State's courts. While Utah courts favor construing a law so as to carry out its legislative intent
and avoiding constitutional conflicts, it will not rewrite a statute or ignore its plain intent. Provo
fa, 935 P.2d 1259,
City Corp. V. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989); Salt Lake City v. Lopl
.App. 1990). One
1262 (Ut. Ct. App. 1997); Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1377 (Ut. c{
may argue that the statute should be narrowly construed to prohibit phone calls made "with intent
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to annoy, alarm... or frighten any person...," but only when made for no lawful purpose. While
such a narrowing construction of the statute may eliminate some of its constitutional
inadequacies, it is clear that the legislature did not intend to qualify the statute in that manner. In
1994, the statute was amended to delete words "without purpose of lawful communications."
Hence, narrowly construing the statue to apply only in situations where the phone call was made
for a now lawful purpose would do "impermissible violence to the clear language of the
ordinance." Willden, 768 P.2d at 458, and would be contrary to the legislature's plain intent.

EXAMPLES OF OVERBROAD TELEPHONE HARASSMENT STATUTES.
Several courts have held statutes similar to the one at issue here to be unconstitutional on
grounds of overbreadth. E.g., People v. Klick, 362 N.E. 2d 329 (111. 1977); Bolles v. People, 541
P.2d 80 (Colo. 1975) (en banc); City of Everett v. Moore, 683 P.2d 617 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
The language of these statutes and Utah's statute is clearly distinguishable from the narrowly
tailored telephone harassment statutes cited by the Petitioner and upheld in Iowa v. Jaeger, 249
N.W. 2d 688 (Iowa 1977), Jones v. Municipality of Anchorage, 754 P.2d 275 (Alaska Ct. App.
1988), and Arizona v. Hagen, 558 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). Similar to Utah's statute,
these statutes specified the intent with which the call must be made; however, contrary to Utah's
statute, these valid statutes also specify the nature of the speech prohibited (e.g., obscene, lewd,
profane, and threatening). The categories of language prohibited by these statutes are consistent
with those held to be unprotected by the Constitution in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). Subsections 1(a) and (b) of Utah's telephone
harassment statute, on the other hand, make no attempt to specify the nature of speech prohibited.
As in the case at hand subsections (a) and (b) directly apply.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Respondent asks this court to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and find that
Utah Code Ann. 76-9-201 is unconstitutionally overbroad. Respondent has stpding to challenge
the constitutionality of the telephone harassment statute as applied to the facts of this case. He
also has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on its face. The subject statute
has a real and substantial deterrent effect on protected speech and the statute is not readily subject
to a narrowing construction by the state's courts; therefore the decision of the| Court of Appeals
that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad should stand.

DATED this

_J_
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